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MUNICIPAL LAW²MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER & ITS ADVERSE EFFECTS 
ON SMALL BUSINESSES IN ARKANSAS: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
I.  INTRODUCTION
Imagine that after many years of hard work, you have established a rel-
atively successful small business within your community. You have regular 
clientele and consistently provide them with quality goods. In addition, you 
have always operated your business in compliance with federal, state, and 
local regulations. Recently, the city in which your business is located enact-
ed a series of ordinances as part of an effort to enhance its aesthetic quali-
ties. The first such ordinance restricted the height of commercial signs and 
required business owners to remove all non-conforming signs from their 
premises at their own expense. Although this ordinance required you to re-
move the prominent metal sign from your property, you were not too dis-
PD\HGE\WKHFLW\¶VDFWLRQEHFDXVH\RXZHUHDEOHWRSODFHVPDOOHUWHPSo-
rary signs in strategic locations throughout the premises. Shortly thereafter, 
KRZHYHU D VLPLODU RUGLQDQFHZDV HQDFWHG WKDW UHVWULFWHG EXVLQHVV RZQHUV¶
display of temporary signs to two nonconsecutive thirty-day periods per 
year. Aside from ruining your advertising plans, this ordinance also ren-
dered useless the long-term contract you had recently entered into with a 
commercial sign supplier. 
7RPDNHPDWWHUVZRUVHWKHFLW\¶VQHZHVWRUGLQDQFHWKUHDWHQVWRDIIHFW
your business more severely than either of the other ordinances passed thus 
far. Aimed at protecting the pavement of the most commonly used streets in 
the city from further damage, this ordinance prohibits businesses from oper-
ating trucks larger than a half-ton on the streets. Because your business is 
located near an affected road and regularly receives shipments of goods 
from a wholesale supplier, at the very least you will have to pay extra fuel 
costs for its trucks to use a series of back roads to reach your business. More 
likely, your supplier will decide to terminate its relationship with you and 
supply a business located near the unaffected streets. Thus, with your man-
ner of advertising restricted and your relationship with your supplier jeop-
ardized, you fear you will soon lose a significant amount of customers. For 
these reasons, you retain the services of a local attorney in an effort to chal-
lenge these new ordinances. 
You file a complaint against the city in court, arguing that the ordi-
nances were enacted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and as such, 
violate your due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. In 
the alternative, you argue that the ordinances must be struck down for 
vagueness. However, you are dismayed to learn that the court has upheld the 
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FLW\¶VDFWLRQVKROGLQJWKDWWKHFLW\³DFWHGFOHDUO\ZLWKLQLWVSROLFHSRZHU
in the LQWHUHVWRIWKHSXEOLFKHDOWKDQGVDIHW\RILWVLQKDELWDQWV´1 Thus, not 
only do you face losing a substantial source of income, but the city has no 
obligation to compensate you for any losses you incur. 
Arkansas case law is replete with scenarios similar to the one described 
above.2 Under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-55-102³0XQLFLSDOFRUSRUDWLRQVVKDOO
have [the] power to make and publish bylaws and ordinances . . . to provide 
for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the 
morals, oUGHUFRPIRUWDQGFRQYHQLHQFHRI>WKHLU@LQKDELWDQWV´3 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory grant of power to 
mean that a municipality may regulate a lawful business in the interests of 
public health, safety, and welfare.4 As long as the municipality has a reason-
able basis for the exercise of this power, a court will uphold the action, re-
gardless of its adverse effect on a business.5 Because this power is consid-
ered a police power, a municipality is not required to compensate a small 
business owner for any losses the business incurs by complying with the 
ordinance.6
This note concerns the power of Arkansas municipalities to regulate 
small businesses in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare. Be-
cause this power is vague, subjects small businesses to unequal treatment, 
and can cause severe economic consequences for small businesses, this note 
will argue that Arkansas courts should adopt a measure that offers greater 
protection to adversely affected small business owners.7
This issue is relevant to advocates for small businesses because the 
level of deference Arkansas courts currently grant to municipal police power 
is extremely high.8 Yet, owing to its inherent flexibility, the scope of munic-
ipal police power is often unclear.9 As a result, small business owners are 
RIWHQ XQSUHSDUHG IRU D QHZO\ HQDFWHG RUGLQDQFH¶V DGYHUVH HIIHFWV RQ WKHLU
1. 6SULQJILHOG Y &LW\ RI /LWWOH 5RFN  $UN  í  6:G  
(1956). 
2. The above ordinances are based on actual ordinances described in City of Fayette-
ville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 547 S.W.2d 94 (1977); City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 
Ark. 405, 836 S.W.2d 863 (1992); and House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 
S.W.2d 831 (1955) respectively. These cases will be discussed in further detail infra. 
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-55-102 (Repl. 1998). 
4. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove 333 Ark. 183, 191±6:Gí
(1998). 
5. See id. at 193, 968 S.W.2d at 605. 
6. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:6 (3d ed. 
2013). 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 197, 968 S.W.2d at 607. 
9. See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 158, 547 S.W.2d 94, 99 (1977) 
(Fogleman, J., dissenting). 
2014] MUNICIPAL LAW 179 
businesses.10 Moreover, because Arkansas courts almost always uphold a 
PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRILWVSROLFHSRZHUVVPDOOEXVLQHss owners currently 
receive little relief from burdensome ordinances.11 Although the Arkansas 
Legislature has recently tried to remedy this situation, the method proposed 
by the Legislature was unsatisfactory, and ultimately failed to be enacted 
into law.12
The first section of this note will discuss the legal basis for municipal 
police power in Arkansas.13 This section will then examine the scope of mu-
nicipal police power in Arkansas, focusing primarily on its use through land 
use devices such as ordinances.14 Cases decided throughout the twentieth 
century established that municipal police power in Arkansas has a very wide 
scope.15 Nevertheless, several instances exist where the use of municipal 
police power is either severely restricted or invalid altogether.16
The second section of this note will identify problems that can result 
when municipal police power is used to regulate small businesses.17 Because 
H[WUHPHO\YDJXHODQJXDJHFDQIUXVWUDWHDVPDOOEXVLQHVVRZQHU¶VDWWHPSWWR
comply with newly enacted regulations, this section will also explore the 
extremely vague language used in ordinances.18 It will also analyze ordi-
nances that subject small businesses to unequal treatment.19 Finally, this 
section will focus on how small business owners can face economic conse-
quences as a direct result of a newly enacted ordinance.20
The final section of this note will consider the value of various judicial 
and legislative remedies.21 This section will conclude by acknowledging that 
although municipal police power is important for the vitality of a communi-
ty, courts in Arkansas should consider adopting an approach that regards 
10. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005). 
11. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 193, 968 S.W.2d at 605. 
12. See infra at Part IV.C. 
13. See infra Part II.A. 
14. See infra Part II.B. 
15. See Pierce Oil Corporation v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Phillips v. Town 
of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 188, 968 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1998); City of Hot Springs v. 
Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 836 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Hatfield v. City of Fayetteville, 278 Ark. 544, 
647 S.W.2d 450 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Company, 278 Ark. 
500, 647 S.W.2d 439 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 155, 547 
6:G+RXVHY&LW\RI7H[DUNDQD$UNí6:G
í*ROGPDQ	&RY&LW\RI1/LWWOH5RFN$UNí6:G
 í 5HLQPDQY&LW\RI/LWWle Rock, 107 Ark. 174, 155 S.W. 105 (1913) 
aff¶d86í
16. See infra Part II.B.3. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part III.A. 
19. See infra Part III.B. 
20. See infra Part III.C. 
21. See infra Part IV. 
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small business owners as a protected class in need of special judicial protec-
tion from burdensome ordinances.22
II.  BACKGROUND
A.   Legal Basis for Municipal Police Power in Arkansas 
Municipalities in Arkansas derive their police powers from a statutory 
grant of power,23 which is consistent with a majority of states.24 The Su-
SUHPH&RXUWRI$UNDQVDVKDVUHIHUUHGWRWKLVSRZHUDVD³plenary duty . . . 
[to be exercised] in the interest[s] of the public health and safety of its in-
KDELWDQWV´25 Although this power is regarded as a duty, municipalities are 
granted broad discretion to determine both whether a need exists for its ex-
ercise and how it should be exercised to benefit the public health, safety, and 
welfare.26 One way a municipality may exercise its police power to meet 
these needs is by enacting ordinances.27 This manifestation of municipal 
police power will be the primary focus of this note. 
Courts in Arkansas gHQHUDOO\XSKROGDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRISROLFH
power, unless it has been preempted by28 or conflicts with state or federal 
law.29 When municipal police power is validly exercised, courts in Arkansas 
KDYHVWDWHGWKDW³SULYDWHULJKWVPXVW\LHOGWR>WKH@Vecurity [of public health, 
SXEOLF VDIHW\DQGSXEOLFFRPIRUW@´30 Accordingly, a municipality is under 
no obligation to compensate a landowner who is adversely affected by mu-
nicipal police power.31 Furthermore, no taking under the Fifth or Fourteenth 
22. See infra Part IV.D. 
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-55-102 ( Repl. 1998). 
24. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:36 (³There is no inherent police power in munic-
ipal corporations . . . delegation by the state is requisite to the existence of police power in 
any municipal corporation.´). 
25. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 189, 968 S.W.2d 600, 603 (1998) 
(emphasis added). It is worth noting that plenary is defined as ³Full; complete; entire.´
BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY 1273 (9th ed. 2009). The justice¶s deliberate choice of this word 
in the opinion reflects the broad scope of municipal police power in Arkansas. 
26. See Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 465, 290 S.W.2d 620, 622 
(1956). 
27. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:49 (describing ordinances as ³legislative enact-
ments of a municipality to exercise the police power vested in it by the constitution, statutes, 
or its charter.´). 
28. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 302 (1995). 
29. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:9. 
30. Beaty v. Humphrey, 195 Ark. 1008, 1008, 115 S.W.2d 559, 561 (1938). 
31. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 32:30 (³[U]nder a reasonable and proper exercise of 
the police power . . . rights in the property may be restricted, impaired or even eliminated 
without compensation to the owners.´). 
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Amendments occur when municipal police power is exercised legitimately 
for the public health, safety, and welfare.32
B.   Scope of Municipal Police Power in Arkansas 
As discussed above, municipalities in Arkansas have very broad discre-
tion to use their police powers. A municipality is free to use its police pow-
ers to regulate a business activity, as long as it determines that the activity 
has somehow violated the public welfare, health, or safety.33 Given the high 
level of deference afforded to municipal police power in Arkansas, however, 
a question naturally arises: how do courts in Arkansas determine whether a 
business activity has violated the public welfare, health, or safety? 
1.    Public Health and Safety 
Early cases tended to focus on the public health and safety elements of 
PXQLFLSDO SROLFH SRZHU 'XULQJ WKH V WZR FDVHV FRQFHUQLQJ D FLW\¶V
SRZHUWRFXUEDEXVLQHVV¶VQXLVDQFH-like activity were presented before the 
Supreme Court of the United States.34 In Reinman v. City of Little Rock,35
Little Rock enacted an ordinance prohibiting livery stables within certain 
DUHDVRIWKHFLW\EHFDXVHLWKDGGHWHUPLQHGWKDWWKHEXVLQHVVHVZHUH³GHWUi-
mental to the health, interest, and prosperity of the cit\´RQDFFRXQWRIWKHLU
³RIIHQVLYHRGRUVDQG>FRQWULEXWLRQWR@GLVHDVH´36 The Supreme Court of 
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVXSKHOGWKHFLW\¶VRUGLQDQFHDVDYDOLGH[HUFLVHRIPXQLFi-
pal police power.37 For similar reasons, in Pierce Oil Corporation v. City of 
Hope,38 WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWXSKHOGDQRUGLQDQFHSURKLELWLQJWKH³VWRULQJRI
SHWUROHXP JDVROLQH >HWF@ ZLWKLQ WKUHH KXQGUHG IHHW RI DQ\ GZHOOLQJ´39
Subsequent cases²which did not reach the Supreme Court of the United 
States²held that junkyards,40 waste paper and rag storage,41 heavy trucks,42
32. Id. (³[C]onstitutional provision that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without compensation is not applicable´ to valid exercises of police power.). 
33. See Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 465, 290 S.W.2d 620, 622 
(1956). 
34. See Robert R. Wright, ZONING LAW IN ARKANSAS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 3 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 421 (1980). 
35. 237 U.S. 171 (1915). 
36. Id. DWí
37. Id. DWí
38. 248 U.S. 498 (1919). 
39. Id. at 499. 
40. See *ROGPDQ	&RY&LW\RI1/LWWOH5RFN$UNí6:G
íXSKROGLQJDQRUGLQance that prohibited junkyards and waste paper and 
rag storage because the city had determined that these business activities were ³fire and 
health hazards and detrimental to the public welfare´). 
41. See id.
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flashing signs,43 and small-scale commercial fowl operations44 could be reg-
ulated under municipal police power, regardless of any detrimental effects to 
local businesses. 
2.    Public Welfare 
Several cases decided during the latter-half of the twentieth century 
clarified the scope of municipal police power by focusing on its public wel-
fare element. In his dissent to City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Incorporated,45
Justice Fogelman argued in support of an ordinance providing for the seven 
year amortization of business signs that failed to conform to height, size, 
and setback requirements even though the city had determined that the non-
conforming signs posed a threat to its scenic resources rather than public 
health and safety.46 He stated that the Arkansas Supreme Court had inter-
SUHWHGWKH WHUPSXEOLFZHOIDUHWRLQFOXGH³SXEOLFFRQYHQLHQFHDQGFRPIRUW
DQGJHQHUDOSURVSHULW\´47 Accordingly, because the term encompassed such 
DEURDGFRQFHSW-XVWLFH)RJHOPDQDUJXHGWKDW³>W@KHIDFWWKDWaesthetic con-
siderations were a significant factor in the exercise of the police power 
VKRXOGQRW LQYDOLGDWH DQRUGLQDQFH´48 Although these viewpoints first sur-
faced in a dissenting opinion, the majority adopted them when it considered 
the same ordinance six years later in City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & 
Trust Company.49 There, the court, acknowledging the trend in other juris-
GLFWLRQVVWDWHGWKDWPXQLFLSDOLWLHVFRXOGXVHWKHLUSROLFHSRZHU³WRPDNHWKH
surroundings in which they live and work more beautiful or more attractive 
RUPRUHFKDUPLQJ´50 Following this decision, the court has regularly upheld 
42. See House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 16í6:Gí
(1955) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited the use of ³any motor truck, truck-tractor with 
semi-trailer or any full trailer´ on certain streets because city had determined that the ordi-
nance was ³necessary to protect the pavement upon said streets, and for the immediate 
preservation of the public health, peace and safety.´). 
43. See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 155, 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (1977) 
(upholding an ordinance that prohibited blinking signs because it could affect the public 
health and safety). 
44. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 188, 968 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1998) 
(upholding ordinance that prohibited commercial fowl operations because town was con-
cerned about the ³deleterious effects of commercial broiler activities´ on the public health). 
45. 261 Ark. 148, 156±71, 547 S.W.2d 94, 98±107 (1977) (Fogelman, J., dissenting). 
46. Id.
47. Id. at 158 n.1, 547 S.W.2d at 100 n.1 (citing Beaty v. Humphrey, 195 Ark. 1008, 115 
S.W.2d 559 (1938)). 
48. Id. at 165, 547 S.W.2d at 102. 
49. 278 Ark. 500, 647 S.W.2d 439 (1983). 
50. Id. at 502±03, 647 S.W.2d at 440; see also Buckley W. Bridges, 2010: A Second 
Odyssey into Arkansas Land-Use Law, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 10±13 (2010) 
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DPXQLFLSDOLW\¶V UHJXODWLRQ RI EXVLQHVV VLJQV LQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI SXEOLFZHl-
fare.51 It remains to be seen whether the court will permit ordinances to 
regulate other business activities under this expanded notion of the public 
welfare. 
3.    Limits 
Although municipalities in Arkansas have broad discretion to regulate 
business activities under their police powers, this power is not without its 
limits. Several instances exist where the use of municipal police power to 
regulate a business is either severely restricted or invalid altogether. One 
such instance occurs when the Arkansas legislature has expressed its intent 
to regulate an area.52 The mere presence of a state law governing a similar 
area as an ordinance does not necessarily indicate preemption, however.53
5DWKHUSUHHPSWLRQRFFXUVZKHQWKH6WDWH³UHJXODW>HV@an area completely so 
DVQRW WR OHDYH UHDVRQDEOH URRP IRU ORFDO UHJXODWLRQ´54 When this has oc-
curred, a municipality may be entirely preempted from exercising its police 
powers in that area,55 or may have to tailor its power to comply with the 
VWDWH¶V JXLGHOLQHV56 $VLPLODU LQVWDQFH RFFXUVZKHQ DPXQLFLSDOLW\¶V H[Hr-
cise of its police power actually conflicts with a state statute.57 Finally, Ar-
NDQVDVFRXUWVLQWKHSDVWKDGLQYDOLGDWHGDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRw-
HUWRUHJXODWHDEXVLQHVVZKHQLWH[FHHGHGWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VVWDWXWRU\JUDQW
of power.58 These decisions, however, were premised on a legal theory that 
is no longer followed in Arkansas.59 Thus, with this manner of challenging a 
(discussing the two cases and their influence on aesthetics as a valid form of land use regula-
tion in Arkansas). 
51. See, e.g., City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 836 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Hat-
field v. City of Fayetteville, 278 Ark. 544, 647 S.W.2d 450 (1983). 
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-43-601 (Repl. 2013) (containing list of ³state affairs´). 
53. See Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 2005-129 (2005). 
54. Id.
55. See Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 302 (1995). 
56. See id. (explaining that a municipality may enact ordinances in an area regulated by 
the State as long as they do not contradict existing state law). 
57. See ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (³No municipal corporation shall be authorized to pass 
any laws contrary to the general laws of the state.´). 
58. See Town of Dyess v. Williams, 247 Ark. 155, 444 S.W.2d 701 (1969) (holding that 
use of municipal police power to require all local businesses to close down from midnight 
until 4:00 am exceeded municipality¶s statutory grant of power); City of Morrilton v. Malco 
Theatres, 202 Ark. 101, 149 S.W.2d 55 (1941) (holding that use of municipal police power to 
prohibit local movie theaters from showing more than one film exceeded municipality¶s
statutory grant of power); Balesh v. City of Hot Springs, 173 Ark. 661, 293 S.W. 14 (1927) 
(holding that use of municipal police power to prohibit the sale of goods by auction exceeded 
municipality¶s statutory grant of power). 
59. See Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 438, 658 S.W.2d 404, 406 (1983). 
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PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRZHUDEURJDWHGOHJDOFKDOOHQJHVWRPXQLFLSDO
police power have become even more difficult in recent years. 
$PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRILWVSRlice power to regulate a business activity 
is frequently challenged under the due process clauses of the state and fed-
eral constitutions. For instance, municipal police power that is exercised in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner violates the substantive due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.60 If a 
municipality enacts an ordinance that lacks a reasonable relation to public 
health, safety, and welfare, then the municipality has acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, and the ordinance is invalid as a matter of law.61 Courts, how-
ever, use the rational-basis standard of review when considering these cases, 
holding that the municipality is in a better position to identify the factors 
necessitating the ordinance.62 As a result, courts in Arkansas almost always 
ILQG WKDW DPXQLFLSDOLW\¶V H[HUFLVH RI LWV SROLFH SRZHUV EHDUV D UHDVRQDEOH
relation to public health, safety, and welfare.63 $PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRI
its police power may also face a due process challenge when the ordinance 
regulating the business activity is written in vague language.64 Yet, a chal-
lenger making this argument faces a daunting burden: A plaintiff must 
GHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH³FKDOOHQJHGODQJXDJHLVYDJXHLQDOORILWVDSSOLFDWLRQV
such that it could never EH DSSOLHG LQ D YDOLGPDQQHU´65 The difficulty of 
such a demonstration will be explained in an upcoming section of this 
note.66
Thus, although municipalities are limited in their use of police power to 
regulate businesses, the power is still extremely broad. Absent a showing 
WKDWWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRZHUZDVSUH-empted by or conflicts 
with state or federal law, an ordinance that regulates a business activity is 
highly unlikely to be overturned in an Arkansas court. 
60. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:9. 
61. See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Hope, 217 Ark. 367, 230 S.W.2d 57 (1950) (ordi-
nance requiring excessive inspection of milk imported from outside of Hope found to be 
arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to plaintiff because plaintiff produced milk under the 
same standards required by the ordinance). 
62. See Johnson v. Sunray Servs., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 505, 816 S.W.2d 582, 587 (1991) 
(³We have long subscribed to a lenient rational basis test in Arkansas´ in determining wheth-
er an ordinance is reasonably related to the public health, safety, and welfare.). 
63. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 193, 968 S.W.2d 600, 605 (1998). 
64. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 15:22. 
65. Craft v. City of Ft. Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 425, 984 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1998). 
66. See infra Part III.A. 
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III. MUNICIPAL POLICE POWERS¶ ADVERSE EFFECTS ON SMALL 
BUSINESSES
Municipal police power in Arkansas can have far-reaching effects on 
local businesses by regulating a broad variety of business activities. Fur-
thermore, because municipal police power is exercised for the benefit of the 
public, a private individual cannot expect to be compensated for any detri-
mental effects he or she personally experiences.67 Although larger business-
es are often able to shoulder burdensome regulations more effectively, a 
small business is less likely to be able to do so; it may lack the financial 
resources to comply with the newly enacted ordinance, or it may lose a sig-
nificant portion of its business by virtue of the ordinance.68 This section will 
explore the various ways in which municipal police power can adversely 
affect a small business in Arkansas. 
$0XQLFLSDO3ROLFH3RZHU¶V9DJXHQHss Leaves Small Business Owners 
Unprepared 
Municipal police power is flexible by its nature.69 Courts in Arkansas 
KDYH UHFRJQL]HG WKLV DVSHFW RI PXQLFLSDO SROLFH SRZHU VWDWLQJ WKDW LW ³LV
admittedly incapable of precise definition and its lines of delimitation are 
QRWFOHDUO\PDUNHG´70 Although this flexibility is necessary for communities 
to deal rapidly with changing conditions, it presents a challenge for small 
businesses: small business owners may not know in advance that their busi-
ness activities pose a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. Conse-
quently, when an ordinance is enacted that regulates an activity specific to 
their business, they are unprepared for any of its detrimental effects on their 
business. Furthermore, it may be unclear whether an ordinance regulating a 
business activity has actually been preempted by or conflicts with state or 
federal law. For example, in an Arkansas Attorney General Opinion, a con-
stituent who questioned the validity of an ordinance regulating smoking in 
UHVWDXUDQWVZDVLQIRUPHGWKDWUHVROXWLRQRIWKHLVVXH³PD\XOWLPDWHO\UHTXLUH
resort to the courts, as the legislature has not clearly expressed its intent with 
UHVSHFWWRWKHH[HUFLVHRIPXQLFLSDOOHJLVODWLYHDXWKRULW\LQWKLVDUHD´71 For 
67. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:6. 
68. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005). 
69. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:8 (Police power ³is not . . . [limited by] prece-
dents based on conditions of a past era . . . it is sufficiently flexible to meet changing condi-
tions that call for revised or new regulations to promote the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare.´). 
70. City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 158, 547 S.W.2d 94, 99 (1977) 
(Fogelman, J., dissenting). 
71. Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 95-302 (1995). 
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small business owners facing a similar situation, this may not be an option, 
as resorting to the courtroom to determine the validity of an ordinance 
would cause them to incur considerable expenses. 
In addition to the flexible nature of municipal police power, ordinances 
regulating business activities are often written in vague or unclear language, 
making it difficult for small businesses to comply with their terms. For in-
stance, an ordinance enacted by the city of North Little Rock prohibited the 
VWRUDJHRIFRPEXVWLEOHPDWWHU³in such a manner as to endanger from fire 
any building or structure within the city limLWV´72 Although the ordinance 
did not specify the acts that would violate this phrase, the court upheld the 
ordinance as a valid exercise of municipal police power.73 Thus, as this case 
demonstrates, courts in Arkansas apply a heavy burden for pre-enforcement 
challenges to ordinances that regulate business activity, regardless of the 
FODULW\RI WKHRUGLQDQFH¶V ODQJXDJH74 A plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
³FKDOOHQJHG ODQJXDJH LV YDJXH LQ DOO RI LWV DSSOLFDWLRQV VXFK WKDW LW FRXOG
never be applied in a valLGPDQQHU´75 Because this burden of proof is so 
high, a small business is unlikely to prevail against a burdensome ordinance 
E\DUJXLQJWKDWWKHRUGLQDQFH¶VYDJXHODQJXDJHPDGHLWGLIILFXOWWRFRPSO\
with the terms. 
B.   Municipal Police Power Subjects Small Businesses to Unequal Treat-
ment 
Small businesses in Arkansas may face unequal treatment when munic-
ipal police power is used to classify them in a manner that causes them to be 
treated inequitably. Under its police powers, a municipality in Arkansas may 
enact such ordinances as long as there is a rational basis for the distinction.76
7KLVGLVWLQFWLRQPD\EHEDVHGVROHO\RQWKHDFWLYLW\¶VFRPPHUFLDOTXDOLWLHV
regardless of whether the activity is substantially similar to an unregulated 
recreational activity. For instance, an ordinance may entirely prohibit small-
scale commercial fowl operations even though the ordinance allows for the 
maintenance of the same amount of fowl kept for personal use.77 Likewise, 
DQRUGLQDQFHPD\UHVWULFWEXVLQHVVRZQHUV¶GLVSOD\V of temporary and porta-
72. Kirkham v. City of N. Little Rock, 227 Ark. 789, 790±91, 301 S.W.2d 559, 560 
(1957) (emphasis added). 
73. See id. at 794±96, 301 S.W.2d at 562±63. 
74. See id.
75. Craft v. City of Ft. Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 425, 984 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1998). 
76. See id. at 425, 984 S.W.2d at 27; see also Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 
183, 195, 968 S.W.2d 600, 606 (1998) (³The issue is not whether the legislation allows dif-
ference in treatment of activities generally similar in character, but whether there is a rational 
basis for the difference.´). 
77. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 195, 968 S.W.2d at 605. 
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EOH VLJQV RQ WKHLU SUHPLVHV WR RQO\ ³WZR QRQFRQVHFXWLYH SHULRGV XS WR 
GD\V HDFK GXULQJ DQ\ FDOHQGDU \HDU´ ZLWKRXW LPSRVLQJ WKH VDPH Ue-
strictions on residential landowners.78 An ordinance may also prohibit busi-
ness owners from operating large trucks on a main road in coming to and 
going from their places of business, but allow individuals to do so when 
coming to and going from their residences.79 $EXVLQHVV¶VORFDWLRQPD\DOVR
play a substantial role in the basis for the distinction.80 Thus, a municipality 
may enact ordinances that prohibit livery stables from operating within cer-
tain areas of the city but not sale stables81 or that impose anti-smoking regu-
ODWLRQVRQEXVLQHVVHVWKDWDUHORFDWHG³LQKLJKO\YLVLEOHDUHDV´82 A munici-
pality is allowed to use its police power for these purposes even if the mu-
nicipality could have accomplished its objective through the use of less re-
strictive regulatory measures.83 Thus, under the current law in Arkansas, a 
small business owner has little chance of successfully challenging an ordi-
nance that classifies his or her business in an unfair manner. 
Small businesses in Arkansas may face a similar instance of unequal 
treatment when municipal police power is used to exclude certain businesses 
from operating within a municipality. Under its police power, a municipality 
in Arkansas may prohibit a previously lawful business activity.84 This power 
may prohibit a business activity that is neither a current threat nor nuisance 
to the community, as long as its activities pose a risk of future harm to the 
public health, safety, and welfare.85 As a direct result of this prohibition, a 
small business may be effectively excluded from operating its business 
within a municipality.86 Although courts in Arkansas had previously stated 
WKDW³DEXVLQHVVODZIXOLQLWVHOIDQGQRWDQXLVDQFHSHUVHPD\EHUHJXODWHG
EXWQRWSURKLELWHG´WKH$UNDQVDV6XSUHPH&RXUWGHFODUHGLQPhillips that it 
had not applied the rule strictly.87 Citing the holding from Pierce Oil 
78. See City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 406, 836 S.W.2d 863, 864 (1992). 
79. See House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 S.W.2d 831 (1955). 
80. See Craft, 335 Ark. at 417, 984 S.W.2d at 22. 
81. See Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 155 S.W. 105 (1913) aff¶d, 237 U.S. 171, 172±
78 (1915). 
82. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005). 
83. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 195, 968 S.W.2d 600, 606 (1998). 
84. See id. at 191±93, 968 S.W.2d 600, 604±05. 
85. See id. at 191, 968 S.W.2d at 604 (³[M]ere possibility of a public harm is sufficient 
basis for the municipality to regulate under its police power.´). 
86. See id.
87. Id. at 193, 968 S.W.2d at 605. Justice Glaze strongly disagreed with the court¶s
analysis of Arkansas case law. In his dissent, Justice Glaze argued that the court incorrectly 
concluded it had not applied the rule strictly because it had ³always analyzed ordinances that 
purport to prohibit lawful businesses under rational-basis review.´ See id. at 199, 968 S.W.2d 
at 608 (Glaze, J., dissenting). According to Justice Glaze, the cases the court cited in support 
of its contention were distinguishable from the instant case: In City of Morrilton, the court 
held that municipal police power only included ³the right to regulate reasonably . . . [not] the 
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Corp.,88 the court held that such ordinances were to be analyzed under a 
rational-basis standard of review.89 7KXVXQGHUWKHFRXUW¶VUXOLQJLQPhillips,
a small business owner has little chance of successfully challenging an ordi-
nance that prohibits an activity specific to his or her business, even if the 
ordinance effectively excludes the business from operating within the mu-
nicipality.90
C.   Municipal Police Power Can Cause Severe Economic Consequences for 
Small Businesses 
An obvious adverse effect of municipal police power is the severe eco-
nomic consequences small businesses may experience following the enact-
ment of an ordinance. One type of economic consequence is the complete 
shutdown of the business, which occurs when an ordinance has prohibited a 
business activity that LV FHQWUDO WR WKH EXVLQHVV¶V RSHUDWLRQV7KLV VFHQDULR
occurred in Reinman,91 Pierce Oil Corp.,92 and Phillips.93 A similar circum-
stance can occur when an individual incurs expenses in preparation for a 
business, only to learn afterwards that a central activity associated with the 
business is prohibited by ordinance.94 Fortunately, it appears that this scenar-
io does not occur regularly in Arkansas, as evidenced by the relative dearth 
of case law on the subject.95 Another type of economic consequence occurs 
when the business is forced to expend money to comply with an ordinance. 
Unlike large corporations, small businesses are often in a position where 
they lack the financial resources to comply easily with newly enacted ordi-
power to prohibit . . . [a business] from conducting its lawful business´; in Piggott State Bank 
v. State Banking Board, 242 Ark. 828, 416 S.W.2d 291 (1967), the power to prohibit was 
specifically supported by statute; in Goldman & Co., the ordinance the court upheld ³did not 
go as far as the one´ in the instance case. See id.
88. See id. at 192, 968 S.W.2d at 605. (³Under our holding in Pierce Oil Corp., a lawful 
business that poses the possibility of harm can be regulated, even if the effect of the ordi-
nance excludes the operation of the business within the city limits.´). 
89. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 194, 968 S.W.2d at 606. (³[O]ur decisions have made . . . 
clear our application of the rational-basis test to ordinances that purport to prohibit lawful 
businesses under the police power.´). 
90. See id.
91. See City of Little Rock v. Reinman, 107 Ark. 174, 155 S.W. 105 (1913), aff¶d, 237 
U.S. 171, 172±78 (1915). 
92. See Pierce Oil Corp v. City of Hope, 127 Ark. 38, 191 S.W. 405 (1917), aff¶d, 248 
U.S. 498 (1919). 
93. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 968 S.W.2d 600 (1998). 
94. See Goldman & Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 220 Ark. 792, 792±94, 249 S.W.2d 
961, 961±63 (1952) (Individual who worked in the waste paper industry purchased two build-
ings in North Little Rock with intent of storing waste paper only to find out that city¶s ordi-
nance prohibited this business activity.). 
95. Of course, the lack of case law on the subject may indicate that small business own-
ers who face such a situation typically choose not to waste their resources litigating this issue. 
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nances. Thus, compliance costs may substDQWLDOO\H[KDXVWDVPDOOEXVLQHVV¶V
financial resources. 
A substantial loss in business is another type of economic consequence 
that small businesses may experience following the enactment of an ordi-
nance. An ordinance may fundamentally alter the character of a business, 
resulting in a significant loss of clientele. Examples of regulations that affect 
the character of a small business include anti-smoking regulations in restau-
rants96 and prohibitions against private clubs serving mixed-drinks between 
2:00 am and 10:00 am.97 A small business also may lose business when an 
ordinance affects its methods of advertising. Examples of these type of regu-
lations includes a prohibition against blinking and flashing signs,98 a re-
striction against the continual display of temporary or portable signs,99 and a 
mandatory removal of all commercial signs that fail to meet size, height, and 
setback requirements.100 These types of regulations make it more difficult 
for small businesses to attract new customers. 
Municipalities are not required to compensate small business owners 
who experience severe economic consequences following the enactment of 
an ordinance owing to the nature of police power.101 As a result, small busi-
ness owners facing one of the three scenarios described above are effective-
ly punished even if they had previously complied with all federal, state, and 
local laws. 
IV.  ARGUMENT
Although municipal police power is essential for the long-term survival 
of a community, the problems above illustrate that the power can adversely 
affect small businesses in a number of ways. Accordingly, Arkansas courts 
should consider adopting judicial measures that are more favorable to small 
EXVLQHVVRZQHUVWKDQWKHFRXUW¶VFXUUHQWUDWLRQDO-basis review standard. By 
doing so, courts in ArkanVDVZRXOGEHDGYDQFLQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQSUo-
moting small business development. This suggestion is in line with Justice 
*OD]H¶VGLVVHQWLQPhillipsLQZKLFKKHVWDWHVWKDW³PXQLFLSDOUHJXODWLRQRI
industries, businesses, trades, and occupations . . . is limited by public policy 
96. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005) (Restaurant owner estimated a 10% loss in 
business due to new anti-smoking ordinances.). Such an ordinance is now moot in light of the 
State¶s passage of indoor anti-smoking legislation. 
97. See Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 436, 658 S.W.2d 404, 405 (1983). 
98. See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 150, 547 S.W.2d 94, 95 
(1977). 
99. See City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 406, 836 S.W.2d 863, 863±64
(1992). 
100. See City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 278 Ark. 500, 501, 647 
S.W.2d 439, 439 (1983). 
101. MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:6. 
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WRSURPRWHWKHJURZWKRIFRPPHUFHDQGLQGXVWU\´102 This section will iden-
tify several judicial and legislative measures, explain how they benefit small 
businesses, weigh their positive and negative aspects, and discuss whether 
courts in Arkansas should consider adopting one of them. 
A. Presumption Against Total Exclusions of Lawful Business Activities 
A presumption against ordinances that totally exclude lawful business 
activities would offer immense protection to small businesses in Arkansas. 
In Pennsylvania, courts have carved out an exception to the general rule that 
ordinances are presumptively valid.103 :KHUH DQ RUGLQDQFH H[FOXGHV ³DQ
RWKHUZLVH OHJLWLPDWH EXVLQHVV DFWLYLW\´ FRXUWV LQ 3HQQV\OYDQLDZLOO UHJDUG
the ordinance as an unconstitutional act.104 Accordingly, the ordinance loses 
its presumption of validity, and the municipality bears the burden of demon-
strating that the exclusion was justified.105 This presumption does not extend 
WR XVHV WKDWZRXOG SRVH ³FOHDUO\ GHOHWHULRXV Hffects upon the general pub-
OLF´106 No court outside of Pennsylvania has adopted this approach, howev-
er.107
The Pennsylvania approach clearly is more favorable to small busi-
nesses than municipalities. As long as a small business can demonstrate that 
municipal police power has been used to exclude a lawful business activity, 
the small business does not have to prove that the municipality acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously. This means the ordinances prohibiting several of the 
lawful business activities discussed earlier²heavy trucks, flashing signs, 
and small-scale commercial fowl operations²would have had a much better 
chance of being invalidated by the court. In addition, the Pennsylvania ap-
proach has the benefit of preventing nearby municipalities from adopting 
102. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 200, 968 S.W.2d 600, 608 (1998) 
(Glaze, J., dissenting). 
103. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.37 (LexisNexis 2003) (quoting 
Beaver Gas Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa. 
1971)). 
104. See id.
105. See id.; Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary 
Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 229, 243 (2003) 
(³[Municipality] must then bear the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance substantially 
benefits the health, safety, and welfare of the community.´). 
106. Beaver Gas Co. v. Zoning Hrg. Bd. of Borough of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa. 
1971). The court lists several examples of such uses: ³[A]ctivit[ies] generally known to give 
off noxious odors, disturb the tranquility of a large area by making loud noises, [or that] have 
the obvious potential of poisoning the air or the water of the area.´ Id.
107. EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET. AL., RATHKOPF¶S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 
22:5 (4th ed. 2012). 
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similar prohibitions against undesirable business activities;108 a municipality 
is less likely to adopt such an ordinance when it would bear an elevated bur-
den of proof in court.109 Undoubtedly, the adoption of the Pennsylvania ap-
proach by courts in Arkansas ZRXOGVXEVWDQWLDOO\SURPRWHWKH6WDWH¶VLQWHr-
est in small business development. 
6HYHUDO IDFWRUV ZHLJK KHDYLO\ DJDLQVW WKH 3HQQV\OYDQLD DSSURDFK¶V
adoption in Arkansas, however. First, no other state has adopted such an 
approach.110 Second, under some circumstances, it may be necessary for a 
municipality to use its police powers to exclude a lawful business activity.111
To hold categorically that all ordinances that prohibit a lawful business ac-
tivity are invalid undermines municipal police power. Finally, because this 
approach focuses solely on the use rather than the individual, a wide variety 
of individuals would be able to contest an ordinance prohibiting a lawful 
business activity. Aside from having a possible chilling effect on a munici-
SDOLW\¶V DELOLW\ WR Xse its police powers, this approach opens the door to 
large, sophisticated entities seeking to have such an ordinance overturned 
for reasons unrelated to those discussed in Section III of this note. For these 
reasons, a presumption against ordinances that totally exclude a lawful busi-
ness activity may not be the best method of protection for small businesses 
against burdensome ordinances. 
B. Use Variances 
A use variance is a land use device that could potentially provide better 
protection to adversely affected small businesses in Arkansas. Landowners 
seek use variances from boards of zoning adjustment for uses that are pro-
hibited by ordinances.112 As with the majority of states, Arkansas permits a 
variance to be granted only in instances ³ZKHUH VWULFW HQIRUFHPent of the 
ordinance would cause undue hardship due to circumstances unique to the 
LQGLYLGXDOSURSHUW\XQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´113 By granting a landowner a use 
variance, the board of zoning adjustment permits the landowner to continue 
the prohibited use without having to challenge or amend the ordinance.114
108. See id. (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court¶s analysis in Exton Quarries, 
Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Whiteland Twp., 425 Pa. 43, 59±60, 228 A.2d 169, 
179 (1967)). 
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:8. 
112. See MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.42. 
113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 1998). See also David W. Ow-
ens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of A Much-
Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 287 (2004) (describing how a majority of states 
use the same type of language in their enabling statutes). 
114. See ZIEGLER, ET. AL, supra note 107, § 58:1. 
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However, under current Arkansas law, boards of zoning adjustment are pro-
hibited from granting use variances to landowners;115 they are limited to 
granting only area variances.116 In contrast, the majority of states provide for 
use variances in their enabling statutes.117
Small business owners would have a more suitable avenue for pursuing 
relief against burdensome ordinances if the Arkansas legislature modified its 
enabling statute to permit use variances. A clear benefit is a potential reduc-
tion in the expenses generated in challenging an ordinance. A small business 
owner who met the hardship requirements would not have to resort to time-
consuming and expensive judicial action to obtain relief; he or she would 
receive a variance for the contested use, and the ordinance would remain in 
place.118 Small businesses that began operating after an ordinance was al-
ready in place might benefit from use variances as well.119 Under current 
Arkansas law, a business activity that an ordinance prohibits is regarded as a 
prohibited use and is not entitled to the same protections as a non-
conforming use.120 For a small business to maintain the business activity it 
must demonstrate that the ordinance itself is unconstitutional; this is ex-
tremely difficult to demonstrate. To receive a use variance, however, a small 
business would only have to prove the existence of a hardship, which is a far 
less exacting burden.121 A final benefit for small businesses seeking relief is 
that boards of zoning adjustment are recognized as quasi-judicial bodies in 
Arkansas.122 $ ODQGRZQHU ZKR LV XQVDWLVILHG ZLWK WKH ERDUG¶V GHQLDO RI D
variance is entitled to appeal the denial to a circuit court under a de novo 
standard of review.123 Accordingly, the court will not give as great a level of 
115. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i)(b) (Repl. 1998) (³The board shall not 
permit, as a variance, any use in a zone that is not permitted under the ordinance.´). 
116. An area variance is typically defined as a variance that ³modifies site development 
requirements for permitted uses, such as lot size, yard, setback, and frontage restrictions[;][it 
does not] change a prohibited use.´ MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.42. 
117. See MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.43. 
118. See Owens, supra note 113, at 317 (explaining that the ³possibility of granting expe-
ditious administrative relief without the necessity of judicial action´ is a reason why zoning 
variances should be retained). 
119. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 968 S.W.2d 600 (1998). 
120. In City of Harrison v. Wilson, 248 Ark. 736, 737, 453 S.W.2d 730, 731 (1970), the 
Arkansas Supreme Court defined a non-conforming use as a ³lawful use that existed when 
the zoning ordinance was adopted and that is permitted by the ordinance to continue.´ Be-
cause of its lawful status, a landowner is entitled to maintain the non-conforming use unless 
the use is abandoned or destroyed, or a municipality enacts an amortization period for the 
use. See WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 17±18. 
121. See infra text accompanying note 125. 
122. See Bridges, supra note 50, at 30 (explaining how the ³Arkansas Supreme Court has 
recognized the quasi-judicial nature of variances,´ and that appeals are subject to a de novo 
standard of review in a trial court.). 
123. See id.
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deference to the board as it would to a municipality under the rational-basis 
standard reserved for legislative actions.124 A small business, therefore, 
would have a slightly better chance of prevailing in this form of judicial 
proceeding. 
The benefits offered by use variances must, however, be balanced 
against their limitations. Because of the manner in which boards of adjust-
ment are supposed to construe the hardship requirement, even if use vari-
ances were allowed in Arkansas, it is possible that few small businesses 
would meet the requirement.125 For instance, a small business that began its 
operations without obtaining a use variance beforehand might not satisfy the 
hardship requirement.126 The fact that few small businesses would be permit-
ted to maintain their prohibited uses suggests that use variances would not 
VXEVWDQWLDOO\SURPRWHWKH6WDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQVPDOOEXVLQHVVGHYHORSPHQW´,Q
addition, although landowners are entitled to a de novo standard of appeal in 
a circuit court, a court PD\XSKROGWKHERDUG¶VGHQLDO³WRLPSOHPHQWWKHMu-
GLFLDO SROLF\ WKDW YDULDQFHV VKRXOG EH JUDQWHG µVSDULQJO\¶´127 Finally, use 
variances are strongly disfavored by land use law academics, lawyers, and 
professionals.128 For these reasons, use variances may not be the best method 
for assisting adversely affected small businesses in Arkansas. 
C. $6XEVWDQWLDO'HFOLQHLQ5HDO3URSHUW\9DOXHDVDQ$XWRPDWLF³7Dk-
LQJ´
During the Arkansas Spring 2013 Legislative Session, legislators pro-
posed Senate Bill 367²entitled ³$Q$FW WR$GGUHVV WKH3URWHFWLRQRI3Ui-
YDWH 3URSHUW\´²as a possible method of resolving conflicts created by a 
124. See id. at 35±36 (referring to the standard of review for quasi-judicial bodies as a 
³zero-deference standard of review´). 
125. A hardship typically must result from the physical condition of the land. See 
WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 19 (stating that a valid hardship occurs when ³the landowner can 
demonstrate that the peculiar shape of his lot, topographical conditions, subsurface problems 
or the like render him unable to comply with the requirements of the ordinance´). But see
Owens, supra note 113, at 298±99 (discussing how in practice many boards of adjustment 
routinely grant a petitioner¶s request for a variance without any regard to the level of hardship 
presented). 
126. Under such circumstances, a board of adjustment would likely find that the small 
business owner¶s actions constitute a self-created hardship²a hardship that the landowner 
created through his or her voluntary acts, as opposed to a hardship caused by restrictive zon-
ing. Upon such a finding, the board is not supposed to grant the variance. See MANDELKER,
supra note 103, § 6.50; but see Owens, supra note 113, at 298±99. 
127. See MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.52. 
128. See generally Owens, supra note 113, at 320 (arguing that use variances are no 
longer needed for effective land use planning, and that states should prohibit them in their 
enabling statutes). 
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PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V H[HUFLVH RI SROLFH SRZHU129 It passed the Arkansas Senate, 
but ultimately failed to pass through the Arkansas House Judicial Commit-
tee in May 2013;130 it remains to be seen whether legislators will attempt to 
pass the bill or a similar version in the next legislative session. In its most 
recent form, the bill proposed to regard any local government regulatory 
action causing a 25% decliQHLQDUHDOSURSHUW\RZQHU¶VIDLU-market value as 
KDYLQJEHHQ ³taken for the use of the public.´131 Any real property owner 
who experienced such a loss would automatically be entitled to compensa-
tion from the municipality.132 As an alternative to compensation, the bill 
would allow a municipality the option of not enforcing the regulatory action 
against the adversely affected landowner.133 The bill broadly defined local 
JRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWRU\DFWLRQDVHQFRPSDVVLQJ³DQ\UXOHUHJXODWLRQODZRU
ordinance that affHFWV WKHIDLUPDUNHWYDOXHRIUHDOSURSHUW\´DQGLQFOXGHG
specific examples of such actions.134 Although the bill created an exemption 
IRUDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRZHUWRLPSURYHSXEOLFKHDOWKDQGVDIe-
ty,135 it appeared to allow recovery for losses caused by the use of municipal 
police to improve the public welfare.136
The advantages that SB 367 affords to adversely affected small busi-
ness owners are apparent. Small business owners would be entitled to auto-
matic compensation from a municipality provided they could demonstrate a 
129. See S.B. 367, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). A similar bill was pro-
posed during the 1995 session of the Arkansas General Assembly. For an excellent analysis 
of that bill, see generally Morton Gitelman, Regulatory Takings and Property Rights in Ar-
kansas, in ARKANSAS POLITICS: A READER 628 (Richard P. Wang & Michael B. Dougan eds., 
1997). 
130. To Address the Protection of Private Property, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=
SB367 (last visited Aug. 4, 2013). 
131. See S.B. 367, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. ³Compensation shall not be required under this subchapter if the regulatory 
program is an exercise of the police power to prevent uses noxious or harmful to the health 
and safety of the public.´ Although the bill defines ³noxious´ as a public nuisance, it does not 
define ³harmful.´ Id. As discussed earlier, under Arkansas case law, the ³harmful´ element of 
municipal police power encompasses a wide range of areas. Accordingly, a municipality 
likely would continue to retain a great level of discretion to regulate in this area under the 
Act. 
136. The bill fails to include the phrase ³public welfare´ within its reference to police 
power. Id. Indeed, the bill explicitly refers to ³aesthetic or scenic districts, environmental 
districts, overlay districts, [and] green space ordinances´ in its definition of the types of regu-
latory programs subject to its provisions. Id. Given that Arkansas case law has held that the 
³public welfare´ element of municipal police power encompasses aesthetics, the bill¶s explic-
it references to aesthetic land use ordinances suggest that a municipality¶s exercise of its 
police power to improve the public welfare would be subject to the bill¶s provisions. 
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GHFOLQHLQWKHLUSURSHUW\¶VIDLUPDUNHWYDOXH7KLVFULWHULRQLVQRWDKLJK
burden to satisfy; it is relatively easy to demonstrate a 25% decline in a real 
SURSHUW\¶V IDLU-market value following the enactment of an ordinance.137
Thus, a small business owner who met that criterion would have no need to 
ZDVWHPRQH\OLWLJDWLQJWKHOHJDOLW\RIDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRILWVSROLFH
power. The bill also benefits small business owners by allowing municipali-
ties the option of not enforcLQJWKHRUGLQDQFHDJDLQVWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODQG,Q
this respect, the bill offers a benefit reminiscent of a use variance. Finally, 
the bill would apply to regulatory actions only when they were actually ap-
SOLHG WR D ODQGRZQHU¶V UHDO SURSHUW\7KXV D VPDOO business owner whose 
business was substantially harmed when a municipality enforced a pre-
existing ordinance against him or her²like the Plaintiff in Phillips²would 
be entitled to relief, despite his or her having engaged in a prohibited use. 
7KHELOO¶VGisadvantages, however, outweigh the advantages it offers to 
VPDOO EXVLQHVV RZQHUV %HFDXVH WKH ELOO H[HPSWV D PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V XVH RI
police power to improve public health and safety from its provisions, many 
small business owners who experienced substantial losses as a direct result 
of municipal police power would be denied relief. Only those small business 
owners who were adversely affected by an ordinance enacted pursuant to an 
aesthetic program would be entitled to aid. As discussed in sections B.1 and 
B.2 of this note, such a group is not representative of the small business 
owners typically affected by municipal police power. The bills most signifi-
cant disadvantage, however, is its potential to severely constrain the ability 
of local governments to use their regulatory power. Because the bill allows 
any real property owner to seek compensation, and sets a relatively low bur-
GHQIRUGHPRQVWUDWLQJD³WDNLQJ´PXQLFLSDOLWLHV OLNHO\ZRXOGULVN ORVLQJD
substantial amount of money in either awarding compensation or defending 
themselves in lawsuits.138 Although the bill allows a municipality the option 
of not enforcing the ordinance against the landowner, this option²like a use 
variance²ZRXOGXQGHUPLQHDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VDELOLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\VWUXFWXUH
and organize its community.139 As a consequence of either one of these op-
tions, the bill likely would have a chilling effect on municipal regulation.140
)LQDOO\ WKHELOO¶V EURDGGHILQLWLRQRI UHJXODWRU\ DFWLRQ ULVNV LQYDOLGDWLQJD
number of ordinances enacted pursuant to federal or state law rather than 
137. See Morton Gitelman, Regulatory Takings and Property Rights in Arkansas, in 
ARKANSAS POLITICS: A READER 628, 656±57 (Richard P. Wang & Michael B. Dougan eds., 
1997) (³For example, an acre of undeveloped land might be worth $20,000 for residential use 
and $50,000 for commercial use. If the land is currently zoned agricultural and the city de-
cides to rezone the area for residential uses, could the landowner claim a reduction in value of 
$30,000?´). 
138. See id. at 654±60. 
139. See id.
140. See id. at 659. 
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municipal police power.141 7KXV WKHELOO VHYHUHO\ FXUWDLOV DPXQLFLSDOLW\¶V
power, while at the same time not fully resolving the conflicts created by 
municipal police power. For these reasons, the approach proposed by SB 
367 is probably not the best method to resolve this conflict. 
D.   Small Business Owners as a Protected Class  
The recognition of small business owners as a protected class by courts 
in Arkansas would offer small businesses greater protection from burden-
some ordinances. Land use law commentators have argued that courts 
should consider applying the Carolene Products IRRWQRWH¶VFULWHULDIRUSUe-
sumption-shifting to land use cases.142 In the Carolene Products footnote, 
WKH &RXUW LQGLFDWHG LW ZRXOG SURYLGH D ³PRUH VHDUFKLQJ MXGLFLDO LQTXLU\´
ZKHQ³SUHMXGLFHDJDLQVWµGLVFUHWHDQGLQVXODU¶PLQRULWLHVWHQGVVHULRXVO\
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
XSRQ WR SURWHFW PLQRULWLHV´143 Bruce Burton, a law professor, has argued 
that small business owners should qualify as a protected class under the 
Carolene Products IRRWQRWH¶VFULWHULD144 Accordingly, Burton argues that in 
cases of an alleged regulatory taking, an adversely affected landowner who 
can demonstrate that he or she is a small business owner, has experienced 
losses for a period longer than six months, and has suffered non-incidental 
damages should be entitled to have the burden of proof shift to the govern-
mental agency to demonstrate that its actions were constitutional.145 This 
note argues for a similar approach but within the context of municipal police 
power. 
Under such a revised approach, a small business owner who could 
demonstrate that he or she has experienced substantial business losses either 
as a direct or indirect result of an ordinance enacted pursuant to municipal 
police power would be entitled to have the burden of proof shift to the mu-
nicipality to demonstrate that its exercise of police power was justified. The 
municipality would have an opportunity to rebut the facts asserted by the 
small business owner or to assert that it acted to curtail an activity deleteri-
141. See Memorandum from Karla M. Burnett, Pulaski Cnty. Att¶y, to Buddy Villines, 
Cnty Judge/CEO (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://posting.arktimes.com/images/blog
images/2013/03/06/1362623189-sb367.pdf.  
142. See Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitu-
tionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 3 (1992). 
143. See id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 
(1938)). 
144. See Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Pre-
sumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the ³Takings Trilogy´, 44 ARK. L. REV. 65, 
114±15 (1991) ([S]mall [business] owners may constitute ³discreet and insular minorities´ . . 
. in special need of judicial recognition under footnote four of Carolene Products.´). 
145. See id. at 117±19. 
2014] MUNICIPAL LAW 197 
ous to the public health, safety, and welfare.146 In addition, the municipality 
could argue that its actions did not cause any economic harm to the small 
business owner or that the small business owner has other viable business 
uses remaining.147 If the municipality is unable to meet its burden of proof, it 
will have to compensate the small business owner for any losses incurred as 
a result of the contested ordinance.148
Several factors indicate that a more stringent form of rational-basis re-
view should be the appropriate standard of review under this analysis. First, 
this standard has been applied to a land use case involving a non-racially 
suspect class, namely by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Incorporated.149 Second, this standard 
ZRXOGQRWVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHVWULFWDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRILWVSROLFHSRZHU,n-
stead, the municipality would have to offer a justification for its exercise of 
the power beyond the fact that it bore a reasonable relation to the public 
health, safety, and welfare.150 Finally, commentators have suggested that a 
heightened level of scrutiny is not applicable outside of a rights analysis, 
which is difficult to develop in a land use case.151
The primary benefit of the protected-class approach lies in its balancing 
RI WKHSDUWLHV¶ UHVSHFWLYH LQWHUHVWV7KH DGYDQWDJHV DIIRUGHG WR VPDOO EXVi-
ness owners are evident: small business owners are presented with a better 
opportunity of obtaining relief from a burdensome ordinance. The small 
business owner would not have to initially attack the ordinance as an arbi-
trary and capricious decision, or maintain a pre-enforcement challenge 
against the ordLQDQFH¶VYDJXHQHVV,QDGGLWLRQWKLVDSSURDFKZRXOGDSSO\WR
all types of municipal police power, unlike SB 367, which focused on the 
public welfare element alone. Finally, this approach would allow all small 
business owners who met the criteria to seek relief; the fact that a small 
business owner either engaged in a business use that was prohibited by a 
previously unenforced ordinance or was indirectly harmed by an ordinance 
would not bar him or her from seeking relief. 
146. See id.; Beaver Gas Co. v. Zoning Hrg. Bd. of Borough of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501, 
504 (Pa. 1971). 
147. Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presump-
tion of Constitutionality in the Wake of the ³Takings Trilogy´, 44 ARK. L. REV. 65, 117±19
(1991). 
148. See id.
149. See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 142, at 13±14. 
150. For instance, a municipality could demonstrate that it conducted detailed studies that 
indicated the use of police power was necessary to resolve the issue. 
151. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Presumption of 
Validity: A Reply to Professor Hopperton, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 103, 110 (1996) 
(³Heightened judicial scrutiny is ultimately grounded in constitutional concerns, and thus 
works best with a rights analysis . . . [;]it is difficult to develop a rights analysis for zoning.´).  
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The advantages afforded to municipalities are less obvious, but sub-
stantial nonetheless. Unlike the Pennsylvania approach, the protected class 
approach gives greater deference to the municipality. Instead of presuming 
that all ordinances that exclude lawful business activities are unconstitution-
al, this approach would give the municipality an opportunity to justify its 
decision with one or all of the defenses mentioned above. Similarly, this 
approach would avoid the harsh results proposed by SB 367 by restricting 
the class of plaintiffs to small business owners only and not allowing small 
business owners to prevail based solely on their having suffered a statutorily 
determined amount of damage. Further, by limiting relief to compensation 
only, this approach would not greatly undermine the ability of municipalities 
to structure and organize their communities through ordinances. Indeed, this 
approach could benefit municipalities by showing them how to better use 
their police powers; if a municipality is unable to justify its actions at court, 
the experience teaches it that it needs to act more prudently before exercis-
ing its police powers in the future.152
The primary disadvantage of the protected class approach is that no ju-
risdiction has adopted an approach similar to it. As such, it is uncertain ex-
actly how courts in Arkansas would utilize such an approach. Still, this fac-
tor alone should not dissuade courts in Arkansas from adopting it. The ad-
vantages afforded to small business owners under this approach would pro-
PRWH WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ VPDll business development. Likewise, this ap-
proach would restrain municipal police power from being exercised to the 
detriment of commerce and industry, which, according to Justice Glaze, 
VKRXOG EH DQ DVSHFW RI $UNDQVDV¶s public policy.153 Finally, the approach 
reaches a better result for small businesses and municipalities than that pro-
posed by the Arkansas Legislature in SB 367. For the foregoing reasons, the 
protected class approach may be the best method by which courts in Arkan-
sas could protect small businesses from burdensome ordinances. 
V.  CONCLUSION
0XQLFLSDOSROLFHSRZHUEHQHILWVDFRPPXQLW\E\EHLQJDEOHWR³PHHW
changing conditions that call for revised or new regulations to promote the 
SXEOLFKHDOWKVDIHW\PRUDOVRUZHOIDUH´154 For the most part, a municipali-
ty exercises its police power with proper discretion to benefit the public. 
Yet, as has been demonstrated throughout this note, municipal police power 
can adversely affect small businesses in a number of ways. Under the cur-
152. Id. at 111 ³The use of a presumption shift, imperfect as it is, can . . . ³teach´ local 
governments how to [make land use decisions] correctly . ´). 
153. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 199, 968 S.W.2d 600, 608 (1998) 
(Glaze, J., dissenting). 
154. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:8. 
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rent law in Arkansas, small businesses that are adversely affected by ordi-
nances have little opportunity for redress in the courtroom. To improve this 
situation, courts in Arkansas should consider adopting a judicial approach 
that regards small businesses as a protected class. This approach would af-
ford small businesses greater protection from burdensome ordinances, while 
at the same time respecting the interests of municipalities in promoting the 
public health, safety, and welfare of the community. Thus, by adopting this 
approDFK FRXUWV LQ $UNDQVDV ZRXOG SURPRWH WKH 6WDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ VPDOO
business development. 
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